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Abstract
We study the optimal execution of market and limit orders with permanent and temporary
price impacts as well as uncertainty in the filling of limit orders. Our continuous-time model
incorporates a trade speed limiter and a trader director to provide better control on the trading
rates. We formulate a stochastic control problem to determine the optimal dynamic strategy for
trade execution, with a quadratic terminal penalty to ensure complete liquidation. In addition,
we identify conditions on the model parameters to ensure optimality of the controls and finiteness
of the associated value functions. For comparison, we also solve the schedule-following optimal
execution problem that penalizes deviations from an order schedule. Numerical results are
provided to illustrate the optimal market and limit orders over time.
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1 Introduction
In the U.S. market, institutional investors own or manage a major share of the public equities.1
For many institutional investors, orders to buy or sell stocks can come in large sizes. Such
large orders are thought to be costly to implement as they create large, immediate demand
(resp. supply) for a buy (resp. sell) order. A large buy (resp. sell) order may cause other
traders to raise (resp. lower) their offered price because they perceive a change in value from
the contra-orders of the institutional investor. This effect of additional implementation cost due
to short-term liquidity demand is often called market impact. Practitioners commonly view this
to be a significant cost to track, avoid or minimize. Slow trading usually reduces market impact
by minimally affecting demand/supply over time. However, this strategy exposes the agency
trader to the risk in the stock price movement and also the failure to complete buying/selling
all desired units of stocks. Hence, it is the goal of many algorithmic traders to decide how to
strategically trade off cost and risk for an institutional trade.
In this paper, we analyze a continuous-time stochastic model for optimal execution using
both market and limit orders. Our paper extends the foundational market impact model of
Almgren and Chriss (2000) by including limit orders with uncertain fill rates, and a speed limiter
that penalizes overly large trading rates. Unlike Almgren and Chriss (2000), our model has two
order types, which can potentially have negative signs (i.e., submission of sell orders in a buy
program or vice versa). Thus, we will need to consider how to keep trading signs to be positive.
Additionally, we construct penalties that drive the optimal trading rates in the desired direction
of complete liquidation. Specifically, we include a non-liquidation terminal penalty as well as a
penalty, called the trade director, to push trading rates for market and limit orders to be in the
same direction. In combination, these three penalties (non-liquidation, trade director and speed
limiter) force the algorithm to trade to full liquidation, while simultaneously tailoring the sign
and magnitude of the trading rates.
Our main objective is to investigate how to optimally allocate aggressive (market) and passive
(limit) orders over time. The aggressive nature of market orders means they tend to have higher
market impact. On the other hand, limit orders are lower cost in both price and market impact,
but they are less likely to fill. The fill uncertainty is modeled as an affine function of the trading
rate in limit orders, and is reflected in an additional diffusion term that is correlated with the
stock price process.
Under our framework, the optimal liquidation problem is cast as a stochastic optimal control
problem. The associated nonlinear HJB equation can be simplified to a system of linear ODEs.
1In 2010, about 67% of the U.S. equity market capitalization is owned/managed by institutional in-
vestors, as compared to 8% in 1950, according to report by SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar. Source:
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808.
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We then explore the special cases of constant and linear uncertainty to examine the properties
of the solutions and analyze the corresponding explicit optimal strategies. Among our results,
we characterize the trader’s buy-sell boundary, which is a time deterministic function governing
when order types are non-negative. We also consider an alternative model to incorporate a
benchmark trading schedule, and show that our model is capable of generating optimal strategies
that very closely follow any given schedule while minimizing trading cost. This allows us to
understand a tradeoff between following schedule and seeking profits, and thus, evaluate how
profitable it may be to deviate from schedule. Throughout the paper, we provide numerical
results to illustrate the optimal liquidation strategies in various settings.
Among our findings, we derive the trading rates explicitly and further examine the conditions
under which they are non-negative over the trading horizon. In addition, we also introduce the
critical time span for an order placement program. If the trading horizon exceeds this critical
time, the trader has too much time to explore profitable opportunities in trading the stock. This
leads to an interesting and intuitive trade-off: the non-liquidation penalty must be increased
in order to prevent the trader from using time to explore unbounded profits, resulting in over
trading.
There are a number of related studies on optimal liquidation with similar basic settings as
in Almgren and Chriss (2000), though liquidation with both market and limit orders has only
come to the forefront of the algorithmic trading literature in recent years. A recent paper by
Cheng et al. (2017) extends the Almgren-Chriss framework to include uncertain order fills of
a single order type. Our paper extends their model to include both market and limit orders,
along with additional constraints and penalties to guide the trade direction and limit order size.
In the case of infinite uncertainty, our framework captures their model as a special case, with
our optimal market order rate coinciding with theirs. Cartea and Jaimungal (2015) proposed a
model for optimal execution with market and limit orders that uses jump processes and optimal
multiple stopping to determine the optimal market order placement time. They too penalize
deviations from a schedule. For a specific example of schedule following, we refer to a recent
study by Cartea and Jaimungal (2016), which derives a closed-form optimal strategy that follows
a volume weighted average price (VWAP) schedule.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the optimal market making problem. Mar-
ket making involves simultaneously determining the prices and quantities to buy and sell a
stock. The market maker receives the spread in exchange for the risk of holding a position.
Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) apply indifference pricing techniques to find the optimal quotes
for a risk-averse investor trading over a finite period. Guilbaud and Pham (2013) study a mar-
ket making problem via the optimal placement of limit orders as well as using market orders to
balance inventory risk. In these studies, there are no constraints on the signs of orders because
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a market maker typically places buy and sell orders simultaneously. For more related studies on
algorithmic trading and market microstructure, we refer to the books by Lehalle and Laruelle
(2013) and by Cartea et al. (2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a stochastic control
problem for optimal order execution under a sell program. In Section 3, we solve the problem
under the assumption of affine order fill uncertainty. Then, we discuss a number of important
properties of the solutions and trading scenarios under constant uncertainty in Section 4 and
under linear uncertainty in Section 5. In Section 6, we adapt our model to penalize strategies
that deviate from a pre-specified schedule for share holdings. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Optimal Order Type Selection
Throughout this paper, we take the perspective of a sell program. The mathematics for a buy
program is completely analogous. We first present the formulation of our optimal execution
model, then derive the optimal strategies. We will further discuss their properties in Sections 4
and 5 under constant and linear limit order uncertainty, respectively.
In the background, we fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P), and a finite trading horizon [0, T ].
Our model involves two stochastic controls: (i) the trading rate of market orders, vt and (ii) the
trading rate of limit orders, Lt, over time t ∈ [0, T ]. The trader’s stock holdings, denoted by xt
at time t, is depleted by the trading rates, vt and Lt. To capture the uncertainty of limit order
fills, there is an additional diffusion term m(Lt)dZt, where m is a deterministic function of the
limit order trading rate and Z is a standard Brownian motion. Precisely, the trader’s position
satisfies the SDE:
dxt = −vtdt+ (−Ltdt+m(Lt)dZt) . (2.1)
The stock price S and transacted price S˜ follow a generalized version of Almgren and Chriss
(2000) dynamics:
dSt = γdxt + µdt+ σdWt,
S˜t = St + h(vt, Lt).
(2.2)
In other words, the price S follows an arithmetic Brownian motion with drift µ ∈ R and volatility
σ > 0, along with a linear permanent impact with coefficient γ > 0. The transacted price reflects
a temporary impact, h(vt, Lt), which is a function of the current trading rates of market and
limit orders. As we seek closed-form solutions, we assume that the temporary impact is affine,
i.e. h(vt, Lt) = −η0 − η1vt − η2Lt, with constants η0, η1, η2 > 0. The two standard Brownian
motions, Z andW , are correlated with an instantaneous correlation parameter ρ ∈ (−1, 1). The
investor’s information flow is modeled by the filtration F generated by (Z,W ), and all admissible
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strategies must be F-adapted.
We typically expect ρm(L) < 0 so long as L ≥ 0. This parameter sign choice will give rise
to an adverse selection effect that is often considered in algorithmic trading models. Adverse
selection is an implicit cost incurred when, for example, the stock price rises just after making
a sale. It would have been better for the trader to wait for the price rise before selling the
stock because then she would have realized an extra profit. To see this, first consider the case
with ρ > 0. Then, if ∆Zt > 0 is observed over some small time period ∆t, we typically see
∆Wt > 0, and thus ∆St > 0, an increase in the stock price. For the model to incorporate an
adverse selection effect, we want the trader to make an excess sale in limit orders. This will
occur if m(Lt) < 0, for then m(Lt)∆Zt < 0 and ∆xt < 0. Reversing the signs and starting
with ρ < 0, we find that we need m(Lt) > 0 for ∆xt < 0. The two cases can be summarized by
the restriction ρm(L) < 0. In our implementation, we will choose parameters that satisfy this
adverse selection criterion, though our model also works when it does not hold.
As a standard performance metric, the profit-and-loss (PNL) of any trading strategy is
defined as
ΠT := xT (ST − S0) +
∫ T
0
(
S0 − S˜u
)
dxu
= xTST − x0S0 −
∫ T
0
S˜udxu. (2.3)
The first two terms in (2.3) measure the change in fair value of the portfolio as measured by the
stock price. The third term is the revenue/cost of trading: it measures at each point in time
the change in position multiplied by the transacted price S˜t at that time. In a sell program,
the infinitesimal amount of shares sold (represented by −dxt) tends to be positive. Thus, the
integral − ∫ T0 S˜udxu can be interpreted as revenue of sale.
When we plug in the dynamics given by equations (2.1) and (2.2), the PNL becomes
ΠT =
γ
2
(
x2T − x20
)
+
∫ T
0
[
µxu + ρσm(Lu) +
γ
2
m2(Lu) + h(vu, Lu)(vu + Lu)
]
du
+
∫ T
0
σxudWu −
∫ T
0
h(vu, Lu)m(Lu)dZu.
(2.4)
We also incorporate three model features: (i) quadratic terminal penalty, (ii) trade director,
and (iii) trade speed limiter. First, we must ensure that the position is actually liquidated.
To that end, we add a quadratic penalty term f¯(x) = −βx2, so that anything but complete
liquidation is undesirable. This is the same penalty as was studied in Cheng et al. (2017).
The second penalty is introduced to penalize placing buy side market orders and sell side limit
orders (or vice versa) simultaneously. Such order placement would be as if the trader were
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buying/selling the stock to herself. This penalty is called the trade director. The goal is to
encourage orders to have the same sign or equivalently, vtLt ≥ 0. In combination with the non-
liquidation penalty, we expect that only the choice vt ≥ 0, Lt ≥ 0. We introduce the penalty
integral
∫ T
0 αvuLudu, with the Lagrange multiplier α ≥ 0.
We also add a speed limiter to prevent the trader from trading too quickly with either order
type. Suppose that management has set two trading speed caps r1, r2 > 0, for market and limit
orders, respectively. To encourage the trader to satisfy the constraints: −r1 ≤ vt ≤ r1 and
−r2 ≤ Lt ≤ r2, for all t, or equivalently, v2t ≤ r21 =: R1 and L2t ≤ r22 =: R2, we introduce the
penalty term
∫ T
0 β1(R1−v2u)+β2(R2−L2u)du, with the Lagrange multipliers β1, β2 ≥ 0. The use
of quadratic penalties such as the ones described here is also found in other classes of trading
problems, such as hedging via risk minimization with constraints (see, for example, Lee (2008)).
Incorporating these three features, and utilizing equation (2.4), we now write the compen-
sated PNL as
Π̂T = ΠT +
∫ T
0
[
αvuLu + β1(R1 − v2u) + β2(R2 − L2u)
]
du+ f¯(xT )
=
γ
2
(
x2T − x20
)
+ f¯(xT ) +
∫ T
0
σxudWu
−
∫ T
0
h(vu, Lu)m(Lu)dZu +
∫ T
0
g(xu, vu, Lu)du, (2.5)
where we have defined
f¯(x) = −βx2,
g(x, v, L) = µx+ ρσm(L) +
γ
2
m2(L) + h(v, L)(v + L)
+ αvL+ β1(R1 − v2) + β2(R2 − L2).
(2.6)
The trader’s objective is to maximize the expectation of the compensated PNL Π̂T in (2.5) by
choosing trading rates for market and limit orders. This leads to the value function
V (t, x) := sup
(vu,Lu)t≤u≤T
E
[
f¯(xT ) +
γ
2
x2T +
∫ T
t
g(xu, Lu, vu)du
∣∣∣ xt = x ]− γ
2
x2. (2.7)
We will study the nonlinear HJB PDE problem associated with the stochastic control problem
(2.7):
Vt + sup
v,L
[
−(v + L)Vx + 1
2
m2(L)Vxx + g(x, v, L)
]
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R,
V (T, x) = f¯(x) +
γ
2
x2, x ∈ R,
(2.8)
and solve for the value function V and the corresponding optimal trading strategies.
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3 Affine Uncertainty of Limit Orders
We present here an analytic solution to the stochastic control problem (2.7) when the fill uncer-
tainty function is affine in the limit order trading rate. In subsequent sections, we will analyze
the special cases with constant uncertainty and linear uncertainty, and highlight their distinct
features.
Following our model formulation, we now set the fill uncertainty and temporary price impact
to be the affine functions:
m(L) = m0 +m1L, and h(v, L) = −η0 − η1v − η2L.
In this case, the HJB PDE problem in (2.8) becomes
Vt + µx+
m20
2
(Vxx + γ) + ρσm0 + β1R1 + β2R2 + sup
v,L
{
J(t, x, v, L)
}
= 0, (3.1)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R, with the terminal condition V (T, x) = (γ2 − β)x2 for all x ∈ R. Note
that J in (3.1) is defined as
J(t, x, v, L) : = −(v + L)Vx + 1
2
(m0 +m1L)
2Vxx + g(x, v, L)
− µx− m
2
0
2
(Vxx + γ)− ρσm0 − β1R1 − β2R2
= (−η0 − Vx +m0m1(Vxx + γ) + ρσm1)L+
(
−η2 − β2 + m
2
1
2
(Vxx + γ)
)
L2
(−η0 − Vx) v + (−η1 − β1) v2 + (α− η1 − η2) vL
where g(x, v, L) is defined in (2.6).
Proposition 3.1 Under the affine uncertainty model, if the value function V (t, x) satisfies the
second-order condition:
m21 Vxx(t, x) < C − γm21, ∀(t, x), (3.2)
where
C :=
4(η1η2 + β1β2 + η1β2 + η2β1)− (η1 + η2 − α)2
2(η1 + β1)
,
then the optimal liquidation problem has finite optimum and there exist unique globally optimal
controls (v∗, L∗).
Proof. The function J in (3.1) is a bivariate quadratic function in v and L, so the first-order
7
conditions for the supremum in (3.1) are a pair of linear equations. To facilitate the presentation,
we define
ψ(t, x) := m21(Vxx(t, x) + γ),
A :=
(
−2η1 − 2β1 α− (η1 + η2)
α− (η1 + η2) ψ(t, x)− 2η2 − 2β2
)
.
where A is the Hessian matrix of J w.r.t. v and L and its dependence on t and x has been
suppressed. Then the first-order conditions are
A
(
v
L
)
=
(
Vx + η0
Vx + η0 −m0m1 (Vxx(t, x) + γ)− ρσm1
)
.
Furthermore, if A is negative definite for all (t, x), then the optimal execution problem has a
finite solution uniquely determined by these first-order conditions.
To check the negative definiteness of the Hessian, we calculate its eigenvalues. The charac-
teristic equation is
det(A− uI) = (2η1 + 2β1 + u)(2η2 + 2β2 − ψ(t, x) + u)− (η1 + η2 − α)2 = 0.
The solutions correspond to the two eigenvalues, u±, given by
u± = −η1 − η2 − β1 − β2 + ψ(t, x)
2
±
√(
ψ(t, x)
2
+ η1 − η2 + β1 − β2
)2
+ (η1 + η2 − α)2.
For u+ < 0, we must have
ψ(t, x) <
4(η1η2 + β1β2 + η1β2 + η2β1)− (η1 + η2 − α)2
2(η1 + β1)
=: C (3.3)
for all (t, x), which is equivalent to condition (3.2). Next, since u− ≤ u+, u+ < 0 implies u− < 0.
As a result, if the controls v and L that solve the first-order conditions yield a solution V to the
HJB equation such that (3.3) holds (or equivalently (3.2) after rearrangement), rearrangement,
then the optimal liquidation problem has a finite optimum. Moreover, the first-order conditions
have a unique solution. Therefore, there exist unique globally optimal controls.
Remark 3.2 We will consider in Section 4 the special case with constant uncertainty (m1 = 0).
Then, condition (3.2) in Proposition 3.1 no longer depends on (t, x) and can be simplified as
C > 0. In Section 4.1 we discuss the practical consequences of this condition. As we will derive
the value function V explicitly, we can directly verify condition (3.2).
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Given the above proposition, we know there exist unique globally optimal controls under
the condition (3.2). We proceed now to find those controls. For simplicity, we denote the
determinant of A by ∆(t, x). This is given by:
∆(t, x) = (2η1 + 2β1)(2η2 + 2β2 − ψ(t, x)) − (η1 + η2 − α)2 .
With this notation, the solutions to the first-order conditions are
v∗t =
(m21(Vxx + γ) + η1 − η2 − 2β2 − α)(Vx + η0)− (η1 + η2 − α)(m0m1(Vxx + γ) + ρσm1)
∆
,
L∗t =
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(Vx + η0) + 2(η1 + β1)(m0m1(Vxx + γ) + ρσm1)
∆
.
(3.4)
Substituting (v∗, L∗) into the HJB equation, we arrive at the following nonlinear PDE:
0 = Vt + µx+
m20
2
(Vxx + γ) + ρσm0 + β1R1 + β2R2 +
(Vx + η0)
2
4(η1 + β1)
+
2(α + β1 + β2)− C
2∆
[
Vx + η0 +
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(m0m1(Vxx + γ) + ρσm1)
2(α+ β1 + β2)− C
]2
,
(3.5)
subject to the terminal condition V (t, x) =
(
γ
2 − β
)
x2.
The quadratic terminal condition suggests the ansatz V (t, x) = a(t)x2 + b(t)x + c(t). This
ansatz will solve equation (3.5) as long as the coefficient functions solve the following system of
first-order ODEs:
0 = a′(t) +
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a2(t), a(T ) =
γ
2
− β,
0 = b′(t) + µ+
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a(t)(b(t) + η0),
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a(t), b(T ) = 0,
0 = c′(t) +
m20
2
(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0 + β1R1 + β2R2
+
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
4(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
(b(t) + η0)
2
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)
2(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
(b(t) + η0)
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)2(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)2
8(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))(2(α + β1 + β2)− C)
, c(T ) = 0.
(3.6)
These ODEs can be solved numerically successively. An analytic strategy would be to first solve
for a(t) by separation of variables. Then we can plug a(t) into the ODE for b(t). The resulting
9
first-order linear inhomogeneous ODE is readily solved. In turn, given a(t) and b(t), the third
ODE is separable and solved directly by integration. In the next sections, we will solve these
equations analytically or numerically to present the solutions and associated trading strategies.
Given that V (t, x) = a(t)x2 + b(t)x + c(t), we can now simplify the second-order condition
(3.2) and express it in terms of a(t) and model parameters:
2m21a(t) < C − γm21, ∀(t, x).
At this point, a satisfies an implicit equation, so it is not possible to simplify the condition
further. Nevertheless, under constant uncertainty, it will simplify significantly as m1 = 0. The
linear uncertainty model will also allow for an analytical solution for a(t).
3.1 Numerical Illustration
Before displaying the numerical implementation of our model, we discuss parameter choices.
For this paper, we are thinking about trades that will be executed within a few hours at very
high speeds. Therefore, it makes sense to consider seconds as the time interval and we use
T = 3, 600 seconds in all simulations. For other parameters, we assume 6.5 trading hours per
day and 252 trading days per year and select parameter values of the same magnitude as those
found in Almgren and Chriss (2000):
S0 = 40$/share, x0 = 10, 000 share,
σ = 0.005 ($/share)/sec.0.5, µ = 10−6 ($/share)/sec.,
γ = 2.5 · 10−7 $/share2, η0 = 0.05 $/share,
η1 = 0.1 ($/share)/(share/sec.), η2 = 0.08 ($/share)/(share/sec.).
Note that converting with 6.5 trading hours per day and 252 trading days per year, we find that
this value of σ and initial stock price correspond to approximately 30% annual volatility. The
value of µ corresponds to approximately 15% annual growth.
A small correlation value, ρ = −0.2, along with positive values of m0 and m1, are selected to
include the adverse selection effect. The uncertainty parameters are chosen as m0 = p0x0T
−0.5,
and m1 = p1
√
T for some (unitless) constants p0 and p1. If we want to compare the constant
and linear uncertainty models then p0 = p1 correspond to similar coefficients on the Brownian
motion driving xt. This is because m1 will multiply Lt, which will roughly be of order x0/T .
Under constant or linear uncertainty we set p0 = p1 = 0.1, whereas under affine uncertainty we
choose p0 = p1 = 0.05 to split the uncertainty between the two components.
The terminal liquidation penalty will be β = 10−3 $/share2. For the speed limiter we choose
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β1 = 5 · 10−4 $/(share/sec.)2, and β2 = 10−4 $/(share/sec.)2. These are small penalties so they
will not over-reduce the trade speed and they are of the same order as the terminal liquidation
penalty. Finally, the trade director penalty is chosen as α = 0.15. In a subsequent section,
we will find an allowable interval for α. For the above parameter values, 0.15 is in the middle
of the interval, just to the left of the center so it does not over-encourage high trade speeds.
Throughout our numerical simulations, these will be the baseline parameters. We highlight
the effects of each parameter by changing them from these baseline values in our numerical
examples.
In Figure 1, we plot the trading rates for models with constant uncertainty, linear uncertainty,
and zero uncertainty in the limit order fills. To ensure a fair comparison, the Brownian motions
generating the asset dynamics and the uncertainty in position are the same across all simulations.
Only the functional forms of the trading rates change. Note that both rates are positive for
all three models. Furthermore, the strategies are primarily dominated by limit orders. This is
preferred in practice because limit orders tend to be lower impact and lower cost. Indeed, that
is the selected parameter choice. For the most part, over the life of the 1 hour sell program, the
trading rates are almost constant when there is no uncertainty, and remain quite stable in the
uncertainty cases. As we approach the execution horizon the rates become more unstable: the
algorithm reacts to small moves to capitalize on low cost opportunities to liquidate the asset.
Nevertheless, over the life of a trade, the linear uncertainty trading rates are typically more
stable and lower than the constant uncertainty trading rates. To see this, notice that the lin-
ear uncertainty can be avoided by choosing Lt = 0, but this is not possible in the constant
uncertainty case. In this sense, there is less uncertainty for a linear uncertainty model versus
a constant uncertainty model. This helps explain the ordering of the trading rates. As the
uncertainty diminishes to no uncertainty, the future is more predictable, so the trader does not
need to resort to overtrading. Finally, note that the trading rates under linear and constant un-
certainties tend to spike up significantly towards the end. The reason is that the non-liquidation
penalty dominates all other costs, and thus, trading is sped up to achieve full liquidation. Again,
even in this highly volatile period, linear uncertainty results in lower trading rates than constant
uncertainty. Interestingly, it is observed that the market order rate exceeds the limit order rate
for the first time near the end of the trading horizon under linear uncertainty. The same does
not occur under constant uncertainty. This is because under linear uncertainty limit order fill
uncertainty can be eliminated by avoiding placing such orders, and the trader who wants to
achieve full liquidation turns to market orders, which do not have fill uncertainty.
Our method encourages non-negativity of trading rates, and the trader tends to maintain
vt > 0 and Lt > 0 for the majority of the sell-program. However, this need not be the case in
general and trading rates have the potential to be negative. Later, in section 4.2 we will show
11
that non-negative trading rates can be guaranteed in special cases.
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Figure 1: Sample paths of the optimal trading rates under (a) constant uncertainty (m0 =
16.6¯), (b) linear uncertainty (m1 = 6), and (c) no uncertainty. Final positions are 217.25,
203.39, and 168.75 shares, respectively. The parameters are x0 = 10, 000, T = 3, 600,
β = 10−3, η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, α = 0.15, β1 = 5 · 10−4, β2 = 10−4, η1 = 0.1,
η2 = 0.08, ρ = −0.2, µ = 10−6, and σ = 0.005.
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Figure 2: The optimal trading rates under one simulation with the following parameters:
x0 = 10, 000, T = 3, 600, β = 10
−3, η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, α = 0.15, β1 = 5 · 10−4,
β2 = 10
−4, ρ = −0.2, µ = 10−6, σ = 0.005, m0 = 8.3¯ and m1 = 3. On the left, η1 = 0.1,
and η2 = 0.05, while on the right η1 = 0.05, and η2 = 0.1. Final positions are 68.5384,
and 80.2371 shares, respectively.
Next, we look at the effect of market impact in Figure 2. We display the simulated trading
rates based on different values of market impact coefficients (η1, η2). On the left panel, market
orders have higher temporary market impact (η1 = 0.1, and η2 = 0.05), and on the right,
limit orders have higher temporary market impact (η1 = 0.05, and η2 = 0.1). As seen in both
scenarios, the trading rate is higher for the order type with the lower market impact cost. In
practice, market orders are expected to have a higher market impact so η1 > η2 is the more
realistic setting.
The sample path for stock holdings over time is shown in Figure 3. Our trading strategy
appears to follow a time-weighted average price (TWAP) strategy. This is evident in the linear
and decreasing path of holdings over time. A TWAP strategy seeks to trade constantly through
time so that the average realized price is the time-weighted price over the execution period.
A linear path of holdings indicates that the total trading rate is approximately constant. In
contrast to TWAP, the optimal strategy appears to have a non-zero terminal target for xT .
A higher β leads the trader to sell more rapidly, and the position ends much closer to zero.
Furthermore, the position is generally decreasing, but we remark that even if vt > 0, and
Lt > 0, xt may increase temporarily due to the Brownian motion movement.
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Figure 3: Sample path of stock holdings with different non-liquidation penalty. The pa-
rameters are: x0 = 10, 000, T = 3, 600, η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, α = 0.15, β1 = 5 · 10−4,
β2 = 10
−4, ρ = −0.2, µ = 10−6, σ = 0.005, η1 = 0.1, η2 = 0.08, m0 = 8.3¯ and m1 = 3.
The low value of β is 10−4 and the high value is 0.1. Final positions are 1546.0197 and
5.3967, respectively.
4 Constant Uncertainty of Limit Orders
In this section, we discuss a number of properties of our model under constant uncertainty of
limit orders fills. Recall that constant uncertainty means the total position, xt is subject to
uncertainty and it is not simply due to trading in limit orders. Since the risk in stock holdings
cannot be avoided, the tradeoff in choosing market and limit orders is between explicit market
impact costs and various implicit costs. The latter costs comprise of the trading penalties set by
the trade director and speed limiter discussed in Section 2. Another way to view this section is
that vt could be a trading rate in one exchange, while Lt is a trading rate in another exchange.
The two venues have different costs of trading in terms of market impact, and the total position
is subject to risk, measured by constant uncertainty.
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4.1 Trade Direction-Speed Trade-off
First, we must check the second-order condition in (3.2). Since we havem1 = 0, so the inequality
simplifies to C > 0, or equivalently
(η1 + η2 − α)2 − 4(η1η2 + β1β2 + η1β2 + η2β1) < 0. (4.1)
Since η1, and η2 are exogenous parameters to be inferred from market data, condition (4.1)
becomes a restriction on the Lagrange multipliers, α, β1 and β2. Suppose that we fix β1 and β2.
Then the left-hand side of (4.1) is a convex quadratic function of α. Thus, there are 2 roots,
and if α is between them, the optimal control problem has a finite solution given uniquely by
the first-order conditions. This results in the admissible range for α:
α ∈
(
η1 + η2 − 2
√
η1η2 + β1β2 + η1β2 + η2β1, η1 + η2 + 2
√
η1η2 + β1β2 + η1β2 + η2β1
)
.
This leads to our first trade-off. The trader director’s Lagrange multiplier, α, ensures our
order types go in the same direction. On the other hand, the Lagrange multipliers, β1 and
β2, tend to reduce the values of vt and Lt since high values are less preferable. However,
increasing βi widens the allowable interval for α. In particular, when βi = 0, the interval is(
η1 + η2 − 2√η1η2, η1 + η2 + 2√η1η2
)
. As the arithmetic mean of a set of numbers is greater
than its geometric mean, the left endpoint is positive, which renders α = 0 an invalid choice.
However, if βi is sufficiently large, then the interval may include α = 0. This discussion reveals
the interesting trade-off between over-reducing trade speed and correctly setting trade direction
in choosing the endogenous parameters, α, β1 and β2. In summary, the trade director cannot
be too strong or too weak unless the speed limiters are sufficiently severe.
4.2 Optimal Strategies
We now consider the associated trading strategies. First, we must solve the ODE system:
0 = a′(t) +
2(α + β1 + β2)
(η1 + β1)C
a2(t),
0 = b′(t) + µ+
2(α + β1 + β2)
(η1 + β1)C
a(t)(b(t) + η0) +
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)ρσm0
(η1 + β1)C
a(t),
0 = c′(t) +
m20
2
(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0 + β1R1 + β2R2 +
(α+ β1 + β2)
2(η1 + β1)C
(b(t) + η0)
2
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)ρσm0
2(η1 + β1)C
(b(t) + η0) +
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)2ρ2σ2m20
8(η1 + β1)C(2(α + β1 + β2)− C) ,
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with terminal conditions a(T ) = γ2 − β, b(T ) = c(T ) = 0. By separation of variables, we obtain
the explicit solution for a(t):
a(t) = − (η1 + β1) (2β − γ)C
2(α + β1 + β2) (2β − γ) (T − t) + 2(η1 + β1)C .
The function a(t) is well defined everywhere except for
t = T +
(η1 + β1)C
(α+ β1 + β2) (2β − γ) =: Tcrit. (4.2)
Suppose that we choose β to be large in order to penalize non-liquidation, and specifically let
us consider β > γ2 . Then, the second term in (4.2) is positive, and Tcrit is never reached as it is
beyond the execution horizon, T , of the sell program. With this definition, a(t) simplifies to
a(t) = − (η1 + β1)C
2(α+ β1 + β2) (Tcrit − t) .
Since, t ∈ [0, T ] ( [0, Tcrit], we conclude a(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, T ], which implies that Vxx(t, x) < 0
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R.
To solve for b(t), we divide the second ODE by a(t), and rearrange to get
b′(t)
a(t)
+
2(α+ β1 + β2)
(η1 + β1)C
(b(t) + η0) = − µ
a(t)
− (η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)ρσm0
(η1 + β1)C
. (4.3)
By using the product rule followed by the ODE for a(t), we have the following identity:
d
dt
[
b(t) + η0
a(t)
]
=
b′(t)
a(t)
− (b(t) + η0) a
′(t)
a2(t)
=
b′(t)
a(t)
+
2(α+ β1 + β2)
(η1 + β1)C
(b(t) + η0). (4.4)
Define
b0(t) :=
(α+ β1 + β2)µ
(η1 + β1)C
[
(Tcrit − t)2 − (Tcrit − T )2
]− (η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)ρσm0(T − t)
(η1 + β1)C
to be the integral of the right-hand side function in (4.3) from t to T . Then, b(t) is explicitly
solved as follows:
d
dt
[
b(t) + η0
a(t)
]
= − µ
a(t)
− (η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)ρσm0
(η1 + β1)C
=⇒ b(t) = −η0 − a(t)
[
2η0
2β − γ + b0(t)
]
.
Finally, c(t) can be computed via direct integration. As the integral is rather complicated and
we will not need its closed-form expression, we omit it. Direct computation shows that the
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optimal trading rates are
v∗t =
(η1 − η2 − 2β2 − α)(2a(t)xt + b(t) + η0)
2(η1 + β1)C
,
L∗t =
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(2a(t)xt + b(t) + η0)
2(η1 + β1)C
.
Notice that the optimal trading strategies are both affine in xt at any time t. We will study the
sign of the trading rates in the next section.
4.3 Buy-Sell Boundary
In this section, we describe the properties that guarantee non-negativity of the trading rates for
constant uncertainty. Naturally, the optimal trading rates should be non-negative because this
means trading strategies do not go against the overall sell program. At the very least, if one
order rate is non-positive, the other should be non-positive to avoid simultaneous buy and sell
orders.
For simplicity, let us assume η1 = η2 ≡ η.2 Then the optimal trading rates are
v∗t =
(−2β2 − α) (2a(t)xt + b(t) + η0)
2(η + β1)C
, (4.5)
L∗t =
(−2β1 − α) (2a(t)xt + b(t) + η0)
2(η + β1)C
. (4.6)
It follows that v∗t , L
∗
t > 0 if and only if 2a(t)xt + b(t) + η0 < 0, or equivalently
2a(t)xt − a(t)
[
2η0
2β − γ + b0(t)
]
< 0.
Since a(t) < 0 for all t, this gives the lower bound as a time deterministic function, above which
the optimal strategy derived in (4.5) and (4.6) simultaneously places sell orders, and below
which the optimal order strategy simultaneously places buy orders. Explicitly, the condition is
xt >
(Tcrit − t)2(α+ β1 + β2)µ
2(η + β1)C
− (Tcrit − T )
2(α+ β1 + β2)µ
2(η + β1)C
+
(α+ 2β1)ρσm0(T − t)
2(η + β1)C
+
η0
2β − γ .
We call this lower boundary on the right-hand side the buy-sell boundary, and denote it by P (t).
2The results in this section still hold if η1 − η2 < 2β2 + α and η2 − η1 < 2β1 + α. So even if η1 6= η2, then one of
these conditions certainly holds (because β1, β2, α > 0 and we either have η1 < η2 or η2 < η1.) and the other holds if
|η1 − η2| is small relative to the Lagrange multipliers.
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Example 4.1 Before discussing the general properties of the buy-sell boundary, we will consider
a special case. Often in practice, µ is assumed to be 0 as it is unknown. Furthermore, setting
η0 = 0, the buy-sell boundary becomes
P (t) =
(α+ 2β1)ρσm0(T − t)
2(η + β1)C
, t ∈ [0, T ].
With the adverse selection condition ρm0 < 0, P (t) is negative ∀ t ∈ [0, T ) and increases to the
value 0 at t = T . Thus, the algorithm continues to sell even if the position becomes short and
will only buy if the position becomes substantially negative.
The boundary is a quadratic3 function of time and is convex (resp. concave) if µ > 0 (resp.
µ < 0). The intuition is that when the position size is sufficiently low, the trader need not worry
about non-liquidation as she has plenty of time to fully liquidate.
To explore its shape properties further, we compute the first derivative of P :
P ′(t) = −(Tcrit − t)(α+ β1 + β2)µ
(η + β1)C
− (α+ 2β1)ρσm0
2(η + β1)C
.
Generally, we expect P (t) to be a non-increasing function of time. To understand when this is
the case, let us fix ideas and assume µ > 0. Then, P (t) is non-increasing for
t ≤ Tcrit + (α+ 2β1)ρσm0
2(α + β1 + β2)µ
(4.7)
= T +
(α+ 2β1)ρσm0(2β − γ) + 2(η + β1)Cµ
2µ(α + β1 + β2)(2β − γ) .
If there is no adverse selection effect, then ρm0 ≥ 0, and the second term is positive, so P is
non-increasing for all t ∈ [0, T ]. However, if there is adverse selection, then ρm0 < 0, and it is
possible that the second term is negative. However as long as
|ρ| ≤
∣∣∣∣ 2(η + β1)Cµ(α+ 2β1)σ(2β − γ)m0
∣∣∣∣ ,
then the second term is non-negative and P (t) is non-increasing for all t. In contrast, to require
3The boundary is quadratic as long as µ 6= 0. Otherwise, P (t) is linear increasing (resp. decreasing) if ρm0 < 0
(resp. > 0). For constant uncertainty, ρm0 < 0 gives us the desired adverse selection effect as discussed. See Example
4.1 for more details.
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P to be non-decreasing for all t means reversing the inequality (4.7), that is,
t ≥ Tcrit + (α+ 2β1)ρσm0
2(α + β1 + β1)µ
= T +
(α+ 2β1)ρσm0(2β − γ) + 2(η + β1)Cµ
2µ(α + β1 + β2)(2β − γ) . (4.8)
In order to ensure that P (t) be non-decreasing for all t, we bound the right-hand side of (4.8)
from above by 0 and rearrange the inequality to obtain
|ρ| ≥
∣∣∣∣2(η + β1)Cµ+ 2Tµ(α+ β1 + β2)(2β − γ)(α+ 2β1)σ(2β − γ)m0
∣∣∣∣ .
In Figure 4, we display the buy-sell boundary for different parameter values. As β governs
aversion to non-liquidation, we analyze the effect of increasing β on the boundary. In the left
panel, we find that the choice of ρ = −0.2 from before leads to a generally increasing P . As the
more intuitive case was a generally decreasing boundary, we also plot this pair of boundaries for
ρ close to zero.4
We expect that a larger β will induce the trader to place sell orders more often than with
a smaller β. Placing buy orders takes us further from liquidation so the boundary is expected
to shift downward. Indeed this can be seen in both panels of Figure 4. As the whole buy-sell
boundary shifts downward, there will of course be a decrease in the terminal value P (T ), which
can be viewed as the target the algorithm has for stock holdings at time T . In fact, we have
P (T ) =
η0
2β − γ .
We can see directly that if the non-liquidation penalty coefficient β increases, the target P (T )
approaches 0. This is consistent with our discussion following Figure 3.
4To have the adverse selection effect, we need ρ to be smaller in absolute value.
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Figure 4: Buy-sell boundaries over time when T = 3, 600, β1 = 5 · 10−4 β2 = 10−4,
η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, η1 = η2 = 0.1, µ = 10−6, σ = 5 · 10−3 and m0 = 16.6¯. On
the left the boundary is generally increasing (ρ = −0.2), while on the right, it is generally
increasing (ρ = −0.0005). We vary β in each figure. The low β is equal to 10−3 while the
high β is 0.1.
5 Linear Uncertainty of Limit Orders
In this section, we consider the case of linear uncertainty of limit orders. This amounts to taking
m0 = 0 in the affine uncertainty model. We discuss a number of properties of the solution and
optimal strategies.
5.1 Liquidation Penalty and Trading Horizon Trade-off
We begin by writing down the condition for optimality as well as the ODEs for a, b and c that
characterize the solution to the optimal execution problem. Recall the second-order condition:
Vxx(t, x) <
C
m2
1
−γ. From the quadratic ansatz, Vxx is independent of x, so the condition depends
only on time. Thus, we find that upon solving the ODE for a(t) numerically or otherwise, we
must check that
sup
0≤t≤T
a(t) <
C
2m21
− γ
2
,
for the particular set of problem parameters.
20
To that end, let us look at the ODEs for a, b and c. In this case, they solve the system:
0 = a′(t) +
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a2(t),
0 = b′(t) + µ+
2(α+ β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a(t)(b(t) + η0)
0 = c′(t) + β1R1 + β2R2 +
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
4(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
(b(t) + η0)
2.
An implicit equation is available for a(t). However, it is much more enlightening to have an
explicit solution. One condition that allows for an explicit solution is
2(α+ β1 + β2) = C.
Although this may seem arbitrary, there are 3 exogenous Lagrange multipliers we can choose
freely so it is not too hard to impose this condition. With this restriction, we simplify the
equation for a(t) to
0 = a′(t) +
a2(t)
η1 + β1
,
with the terminal condition a(T ) = γ2 − β. This leads to the explicit solution
a(t) = − (η1 + β1) (2β − γ)
2 (η1 + β1) + (T − t) (2β − γ) . (5.1)
Next, we solve for b(t). Divide equation for b(t) by a(t) (again valid since a(t) < 0∀ t) and
rearrange, we have
− µ
a(t)
=
b′(t)
a(t)
+
b(t) + η0
η1 + β1
.
Plugging in the expression of a(t) from (5.1) and recalling (4.4), we arrive at
d
dt
[
b(t) + η0
a(t)
]
=
2µ
2β − γ +
µ(T − t)
η1 + β1
=⇒ b(t) = −η0 − a(t)
[
2η0
2β − γ +
2µ(T − t)
2β − γ +
µ(T − t)2
2(η1 + β1)
]
.
With this, c(t) can be computed by direct integration of the associated ODE. The solution is
not useful in our analysis however.
Using (5.1), we can express condition (3.2) that ensures the finiteness of the value function
as
− (η1 + β1) (2β − γ)
2 (η1 + β1) + T (2β − γ) <
C − γm21
2m21
. (5.2)
Again, we assume 2β > γ. If C ≥ γm21, the left-hand side of (5.2) is negative, while the right-
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hand side is non-negative so the condition holds. If on the other hand, C < γm21, we must
have
T <
4m21(η1 + β1)(β − γ) + 2(η1 + β1)C
(γm21 − C)(2β − γ)
:= Tmax. (5.3)
In other words, we have translated condition (3.2) into an upper bound on the horizon T . This
means that there is a finite maximum trading horizon in order for the value function to be finite.
Given a fixed T > 0, we can turn condition (5.3) to a lower bound on β, that is,
β > γ − C
2m21
>
γ
2
. (5.4)
In fact, condition (5.4) is more stringent than the original condition: β > γ/2.
Also, the maximum horizon Tmax is increasing in β, namely,
∂Tmax
∂β
=
∂
∂β
[
4m21(η1 + β1)(β − γ) + 2(η1 + β1)C
(γm21 − C)(2β − γ)
]
=
4(η1 + β1)
(2β − γ)2 > 0.
This reveals that a higher non-liquidation penalty coefficient β permits a longer admissible
trading horizon Tmax because the trader is sufficiently motivated to achieve full liquidation,
rather than trading for profits. Nevertheless, there is a finite limit for the maximum horizon.
Indeed, as β →∞, Tmax → 2m21(η1 + β1)/(γm21 − C).
Let us consider the trade-off differently by imposing a condition on β. Starting from equation
(5.2), we obtain
−
[
η1 + β1 +
C − γm21
2m21
T
](
β − γ
2
)
<
C − γm21
2m21
(η1 + β1).
The coefficient of β − γ2 must be positive. If it were non-positive then the fact that both η1 > 0
and β1 > 0 implies C < γm
2
1 (it must be strict for otherwise, the coefficient would be positive)
and so the right-hand side of the inequality is negative. However, the left-hand side would
then be non-negative after accounting for the negative sign, so the condition cannot hold if this
coefficient is non-positive. It follows that we can rewrite condition (5.2) as
β >
γ
2
− (C − γm
2
1)(η1 + β1)
2m21(η1 + β1) + (C − γm21)T
.
Our discussion above demonstrates that the denominator of the second term is positive does
not necessarily require C ≥ γm21 (the difference can be negative, just not too negative), so this
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is not a trivial condition.5 Putting this together with the previous restriction on β, we have
β >
γ
2
+
[
(γm21 − C)(η1 + β1)
2m21(η1 + β1) + (C − γm21)T
]+
.
From this condition, we see that the trader must be imposed with a sufficiently high non-
liquidation penalty. If not, she will spend time profiting from other opportunities over the
trading horizon and by time t = T , she need not liquidate the asset fully. In particular, she will
follow a strategy that exploits profits in the model far in excess of her costs for non-liquidation.
Mathematically, this condition on β guarantees the finiteness of the value function for the
optimal liquidation problem.
5.2 Infinite Uncertainty Limit
In the case of linear uncertainty, it is possible to set Lt = 0 and ignore the limit order fill
uncertainty. Conversely, a large linear uncertainty should promote little to no limit orders.
Intuitively, if limit orders have infinite uncertainty to fill, then we expect that they will not be
utilized. To demonstrate this, we begin by taking the limit as m1 →∞ in equation (3.6) with
m0 = 0.
6 For simplicity, we also take µ = 0. The limiting ODE system becomes
0 = a′(t) +
a2(t)
η1 + β1
,
0 = b′(t) +
a(t)(b(t) + η0)
η1 + β1
,
0 = c′(t) + β1R1 + β2R2 +
(b(t) + η0)
2
4(η1 + β1)
,
with the terminal conditions a(T ) = γ2 − β, b(T ) = 0, c(T ) = 0.7 We have previously solved
the ODE for a(t) in section 5.1. Therefore, the optimality condition regarding the supremum of
a(t) is the same and since m1 →∞, we can never have C ≥ γm21. Thus, there is a condition on
5In other words, if C ≥ γm21, then (accounting for the negative sign), the lower bound is strictly less than γ2 . We
already require that β > γ2 , so in this case the extra condition is trivial.
6The ODE is different for c if m0 6= 0, but everything else that follows in this section still holds for a and b.
7As the solution to an ODE is effectively an integral, we are interchanging limit and integral and must justify the
switch. The implicit solution to the ODE for a(t) is −K1 ln |z1− a(T )|+K1 ln |z1− a(t)|+K2 ln |a(T )| −K2 ln |a(t)| −
K3
a(T ) +
K3
a(t) = −z3(T − t), where K1 = K2 = z2−z1z2
1
, K3 =
z2
z1
, z1 =
2(α+β1+β2)−γm
2
1
2m2
1
, z2 =
C−γm2
1
2m2
1
, and z3 =
1
η1+β1
.
The limiting solution as m1 → ∞ is exactly the solution to the above ODE for a. The closed form solution for b is
b(t) = −η0 + a(t)
[∫ T
t
µ
a(s)ds− 2η02β−γ
]
. If µ = 0, then we can take the limit and get the solution for b(t) from the last
section when µ = 0 and m1 →∞.
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T that it must be less than Tmax, when m1 →∞. This limit indicates
T <
4(η1 + β1)(β − γ)
γ(2β − γ) .
We can put this in terms of a lower bound on the non-liquidation penalty:
β >
γ
2
+
[
γ(η1 + β1)
2(η1 + β1)− γT
]+
.
Assuming the optimality condition holds, then the solution we have generated from the first order
conditions is the unique optimizer for the stochastic control problem. Note that implicitly, β
must be greater than γ now for the right-hand side bound to even be positive.
Next we consider the trading rates. Looking at equation (3.4), we let m1 → ∞. When we
do that, L∗t → 0, while
v∗t → −
1
2
(
Vx + η0
η1 + β1
)
=
(
xt − η0
η1 + β1
)
2β − γ
2 (η1 + β1) + (T − t) (2β − γ) .
So in the infinite uncertainty case, the strategy is to place only market orders.8 Interestingly,
the infinite uncertainty limit is exactly that of Cheng et al. (2017) in the constant uncertainty
case (recall before that this did not depend on m0.) When η0 = 0 and β1 = 0, we get the
optimal trading rate derived in the appendix of that paper.
6 Schedule Following
In this section, we incorporate a parent order schedule into the order placement problem. The
trader has both market and limit orders at her disposal and is now given a time-deterministic
schedule function, Q(t) defined over the trading horizon [0, T ]. We assume that Q(t) is a non-
negative, non-increasing, bounded continuous function of time, with an initial value Q(0) = x0.
The trader seeks to track Q(t) as closely as possible. Specifically, we would like to keep the
stochastic number of shares that we hold at time t, xt close to Q(t) for all times t ∈ [0, T ] and
not only at the terminal time T . To avoid having conflicting goals, we set Q(T ) = 0 to have a
schedule for full liquidation.
In order to keep xt close to Q(t), we consider a penalty of the form
∫ T
0 λ (u, xu −Q(u)) du,
where λ(t, y) is a function with global maximum of 0 at y = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Since λ(t, y) has a
global max of 0 at 0, the optimizer should choose order types in such a way as to keep xt−Q(t)
close to or equal to 0. Furthermore, the penalty term accumulates deviations at all times
8It is worth noting that the trading rate is non-negative as long as xt >
η0
η1+β1
.
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t ∈ [0, T ] and may even place more emphasis on certain times due to its time argument. For
example, λ(t, y) could be increasing in t for all y then deviations early on are allowed, but as we
approach the terminal time, the scheduler shall be forced to push xt closer to Q(t). Henceforth,
we let λ(t, y) = −w(t)y2 so that deviations from above/below are penalized equally, and in just
the same manner as the terminal penalty. We assume that w(t) is a non-negative and continous
function of time. Moreover, we assume that w(t) is bounded over the interval [0, T ].
Now we will maximize the sum of expected compensated PNL as defined previously together
with expected accumulated deviations. The value function is
V (t, x) := sup
(vt,Lt)0≤t≤T
E
[
f¯(x) +
γ
2
x2T +
∫ T
t
[g(xu, Lu, vu) + λ(u, xu −Q(u))] du
∣∣∣xt = x]− γ
2
x2.
We then conclude that V satisfies the following nonlinear HJB PDE problem:
Vt + sup
v,L
[
−(v + L)Vx + 1
2
m2(L)Vxx + g(x, v, L)
]
+ λ(t, x−Q(t)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) ×R,
V (T, x) = f¯(x) +
γ
2
x2, x ∈ R.
Like in previous sections, one can perform the same optimization to derive the optimal trading
rates v∗ and L∗, and the value function will be of the same quadratic form: V (t, x) = a(t)x2 +
b(t)x+c(t). However, the inhomogeneous term λ(t, x−Q(t)) will affect the solutions of resulting
ODEs. Specifically, we have the ODE system:
0 = a′(t) +
2(α+ β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a2(t)− w(t),
0 = b′(t) + µ+
2(α + β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a(t)(b(t) + η0)
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)
(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
a(t) + 2w(t)Q(t),
0 = c′(t) +
m20
2
(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0 + β1R1 + β2R2 +
2(α+ β1 + β2)−m21(2a(t) + γ)
4(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
(b(t) + η0)
2
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)
2(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))
(b(t) + η0)
+
(η2 − η1 − α− 2β1)2(m0m1(2a(t) + γ) + ρσm0)2
8(η1 + β1)(C −m21(2a(t) + γ))(2(α + β1 + β2)− C)
− w(t)Q(t)2
with terminal conditions a(T ) = γ2 − β, b(T ) = c(T ) = 0.
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Figure 5: The improvement to schedule following with a small, time-uniform penalty
w(t) = 10−4 ∀ t. Other parameters are x0 = 10, 000, T = 3, 600, β1 = 5 · 10−4, β2 = 10−4,
η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, η1 = 0.1, η2 = 0.08, µ = 10−6, σ = 0.005, ρ = −0.2, m0 = 8.3¯,
and m1 = 3. Superimposed are an unpenalized time series (blue), a time series targeting
TWAP (red) and a time series targeting Q(t) = x0
[
1− ( t
T
)2]
.
In practice, traders may be given guidance to follow the time-deterministic schedule, such
as the one in Almgren and Chriss (2000). Our model allows a trader to quantitatively evaluate
the cost of deviating from schedule. Here, we illustrate the allocation of market and limit orders
over time accounting for the penalty of schedule deviation. Figure 5 displays the trader’s stock
holdings over time in three settings: (i) a quadratic schedule defined by Q(t) = x0
[
1− ( t
T
)2]
,
and (ii) a linear schedule Q(t) = x0
(
1− t
T
)
, and (iii) no schedule (wherein we set w(t) ≡ 0). As
we can see, the trader’s position persistently tracks the schedule over the trading horizon, even
with a small constant penalization coefficient w(t) = 10−4. Compared to the linear schedule,
the quadratic schedule is useful for an institution that seeks to start out trading slowly and
eventually speed up at the end of the sell program. We see that our model is capable of
handling complicated non-linear schedules for stock holdings over time.
We examine the effects on trading rates in Figure 6. On the left panel, there is no penalty
for deviating from the linear schedule, while on the right we give a small penalty for deviating.
We find that the penalized allocator trades much more quickly and reacts more quickly to price
movements. Indeed, the non-penalized trading rates are very stable until the very end of the
sell program and the penalized trading rates change rapidly over time. In contrast, the total
trading rate in the non-penalized case (right panel) is fluctuating in a relatively small range. In
the penalized case, more market orders are used over time, but the opposite is true when the
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penalty is removed.
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Figure 6: Comparison of trading rates with and without penalty. On the left, there is no
penalty and on the left we penalize deviations from a linear schedule with constant weight
w(t) = 10−4. Other parameters are x0 = 10, 000, T = 3, 600, β1 = 5 · 10−4, β2 = 10−4,
η0 = 0.05, γ = 2.5 · 10−7, η1 = 0.1, η2 = 0.08, µ = 10−6, σ = 0.005, ρ = −0.2, m0 = 8.3¯,
and m1 = 3. Final positions are 190.4408 and 94.4218, respectively.
7 Concluding Remarks
By incorporating a number of new features, our order placement model allows for better control
of the trading problem. For example, the trade limiter and director regulate the speed and
direction of trades. Moreover, the multiple penalties lead to a number of trade-offs. Among
them, we find that the trade director cannot be too strong or too weak unless the speed limiters
are sufficiently severe.
The literature on optimal execution continues to grow in volume and diversity. One direction
for future research as pertained to our order placement problem is to expand the trading platform
to include multiple exchanges to allocate orders as in Kukanov (2013). These exchanges have
varying costs of filling orders and risks associated with them. This gives rise to a venue allocation
problem. Another related problem is trading in lit and dark pools. Whereas in a lit pool (or
exchange) the order book imbalance can be observed, a dark pool blinds the trader from such
information (see e.g. Kratz and Schoeneborn (2015)). This suggests a robust optimization or
model uncertainty approach to optimal execution not previously considered. Furthermore, the
problem of optimal liquidation is applicable not only to stocks, but also to options and other
derivatives (see e.g. Leung and Liu (2012); Leung and Shirai (2015)).
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